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OPINION 
______________ 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Jim Thorpe, multi-sport Olympic gold medalist 
(“Thorpe”), died in California in 1953 without a will.1  His 
                                              
1 Some commentators still regard Thorpe as “the greatest 
Olympian of all time.” See Sally Jenkins, Greatest Olympic 
athlete? Jim Thorpe, not Usain Bolt, WASHINGTON POST, 
Aug. 10, 2012, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/olympics/greatest-
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estate was assigned to his third wife, Patricia (“Patsy”),2 who 
eventually buried him in what is now Jim Thorpe, 
Pennsylvania (“the Borough”).  Jim Thorpe, Pennsylvania 
was a newly-formed borough that had been created from the 
merger of the boroughs of Mauch Chunk and East Mauch 
Chunk. Thorpe was buried in this new borough over the 
objections of several children from his previous marriages.  
Thorpe was a Native American of Sauk heritage and a 
member of the Sac and Fox Nation of Oklahoma.  Over the 
years, some of Thorpe’s eight children have spoken out in 
protest of their father’s burial, advocating that he be reburied 
on Sac and Fox tribal land in Oklahoma.   
 
 In 1990, years after Thorpe’s death and burial, 
Congress enacted the Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act (“NAGPRA”).  NAGPRA was intended to 
ameliorate and correct past abuses inflicted upon Native 
Americans and their culture and to protect Native American 
human remains and cultural artifacts.  NAGPRA requires 
museums and Federal agencies possessing or controlling 
holdings or collections of Native American human remains to 
inventory those remains, notify the affected tribe, and, upon 
the request of a known lineal descendent of the deceased 
Native American or of the tribe, return such remains.  25 
U.S.C. §§ 3003, 3005.  
 
 In 2010, John Thorpe, the son of Thorpe and his 
second wife Freeda, sued the Borough for failing to comply 
with NAGPRA.3  The District Court concluded that the 
Borough was a “museum” within the meaning of NAGPRA 
and provisions of that law required the Borough to disinter 
Thorpe’s remains and turn them over to the Sac and Fox tribe 
as requested by John Thorpe.  This appeal followed.  
                                                                                                     
olympic-athlete-jim-thorpe-not-usain-
bolt/2012/08/10/f9114872-e33c-11e1-ae7f-
d2a13e249eb2_story.html.  
 
2 Patsy Thorpe is deceased.  She and Jim Thorpe did not have 
children together. 
3 John Thorpe was often called Jack Thorpe, both in his life 
and in this litigation. For clarity, we will refer to him only as 
John Thorpe.  
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 We conclude that Congress could not have intended 
the kind of patently absurd result that would follow from a 
court resolving a family dispute by applying NAGPRA to 
Thorpe’s burial in the Borough under the circumstances here. 
We therefore hold that the District Court erred in overturning 
the clearly expressed wishes of Thorpe’s wife by ordering his 
body to be exhumed and his remains delivered to John 
Thorpe.4 
 
II.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
 Thorpe died in California in 1953.  Thereafter, Patsy, 
in cooperation with the Oklahoma legislature, made initial 
plans for him to be buried in Oklahoma.5 According to 
Plaintiffs, Thorpe had told family members that he wanted to 
be buried in Oklahoma. However, the parties agree that Patsy 
Thorpe had legal authority over the disposition of Thorpe’s 
body and his estate.  In any event, at some point following 
Thorpe’s death, a bill was drafted by the Oklahoma 
legislature that would have provided funding for a permanent 
memorial near the contemplated site for Thorpe’s grave.  
However, in what was a harbinger of difficulties to come, the 
bill was vetoed by the Governor of Oklahoma. This sad and 
regrettable posthumous saga took an even more ominous turn 
when Patsy, assisted by state law enforcement officers, 
intervened in Thorpe’s ritual burial ceremony in Oklahoma, 
and caused Thorpe’s casket to be removed and stored.  After 
considering various sites for Thorpe’s burial,6 Patsy arranged 
                                              
4 Because we conclude that the Borough is not a “museum” 
because NAGPRA does not apply here, we do not consider 
the Borough’s argument that the doctrine of laches bars this 
action. 
 
5 As we explained at the outset, Patsy is Thorpe’s third wife.  
 
6 Patsy had also considered burying Thorpe in Carlisle, 
Pennsylvania, where Thorpe played football as a teenager 
under legendary coach Pop Warner at Carlisle Indian 
Industrial School.  John Luciew, Town of Jim Thorpe is 
Ready to Fight for Identity it Adopted 56 Years Ago, 
PENNLIVE, Aug. 2, 2010, 
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to have Thorpe buried at a location in Jim Thorpe, 
Pennsylvania.  That municipality was to be formed by the 
merger of Mauch Chunk and East Mauch Chunk, and the 
resulting borough was to be named Jim Thorpe.  This 
agreement was reached despite the objection of several of 
Thorpe’s children.7  The agreement provided in part that 
Mauch Chunk and East Mauch Chunk would consolidate 
under the name “Jim Thorpe” “as a fitting tribute and 
memorial to the person and memory of the husband of [Patsy 
Thorpe] and that appropriately correlated to such designation 
of the name ‘Jim Thorpe’ the remains of [him] be laid to rest 
in the community so bearing his name.”  Appendix (“App.”) 
486.  Patsy Thorpe intended that the Borough would be “the 
final and permanent resting place” for her husband.  Id.   
 
 After the arrangements were made for the burial site in 
the Borough, Thorpe was first buried at the Evergreen 
Cemetery in the Borough while a mausoleum was being 
constructed for his remains. In 1957, he was interred in what 
was believed to be his final resting place.8 The agreement 
Patsy had reached with the Borough provides that the 
Borough is responsible for the maintenance at the burial site. 
However, family members have visited the site over the years 
and have worked with the Borough to conduct tribal 
                                                                                                     
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2010/08/town_of
_jim_thorpe_is_ready_to.html.  
 
7 Thorpe’s descendents never reached a unanimous agreement 
about where he should be buried. Charlotte Thorpe, Jim 
Thorpe’s daughter by his first wife Iva, helped Patsy decide 
on his final burial site in the newly formed borough of Jim 
Thorpe, Pennsylvania.  Appendix (“App.”) 413. 
 
8 At least Patsy and the leaders of the Borough thought this 
was his final resting place. The Mayor of the Borough 
testified that he was aware of newspaper articles and speeches 
in which John Thorpe, one of Thorpe’s sons from his second 
marriage, expressed a desire to move the body, but the 
Borough was never formally informed of that desire.  App. 
361-62. 
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ceremonies. The Jim Thorpe Hall of Fame has also worked to 
improve the site.  
 
 John Thorpe filed the instant Complaint in 2010, 
alleging that the Borough had failed to comply with 
NAGPRA.9  The Borough immediately moved to dismiss the 
complaint.  The District Court dismissed John Thorpe’s § 
1983 claim but allowed him to proceed under NAGPRA.10  
John Thorpe was also ordered to join all necessary parties in 
an amended complaint or submit evidence and briefing 
showing that joinder of any or all of the necessary parties was 
not feasible and that the action could proceed in “equity and 
good conscience” under Rule 19(b).  App. 171.  John Thorpe 
died the following year and the proceedings were stayed until 
his attorney filed an amended complaint naming as new 
plaintiffs John’s brothers Richard and William Thorpe, the 
sons of Jim Thorpe and his second wife Freeda (“Plaintiffs”).   
 
 Thereafter, the District Court granted Plaintiffs’ 
motion for summary judgment based on its conclusion that 
“[t]he Borough of Jim Thorpe is a ‘museum’ under 
[NAGPRA] and subject to the requirements of the Act, 
including those provisions governing repatriation requests.”  
                                              
9 Over fifty years passed between Jim Thorpe’s death and this 
challenge to his burial.  The Plaintiffs waited for their sister, 
Grace Thorpe, to die before instituting this action because she 
did not agree that Thorpe’s remains should be removed from 
the Borough.  App. 414. In addition, Plaintiffs did not 
challenge the disposition of Thorpe’s estate in California 
immediately after his death.  App. 390. 
 
10 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states: “Every person who, under color of 
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation 
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress.” 
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App. 80.  The Borough appealed that finding and Plaintiffs 
appealed the District Court’s dismissal of their §1983 claim.11  
III.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
  The District Court had federal question jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. NAGPRA’s jurisdictional 
provision vests federal courts with jurisdiction over “any 
action brought by any person alleging a violation of” 
NAGPRA.  25 U.S.C. § 3013.12  This Court exercises plenary 
review over the District Court’s finding of law that NAGPRA 
applies to Thorpe’s burial.  Pell v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & 
Co., 539 F.3d 292, 305 (3d Cir. 2008).  
 
                                              
11 Plaintiffs also sued several individual defendants, who are 
participating only in the cross-appeal as cross-appellees. Also 
participating in this appeal as amici are the National Congress 
of the American Indians, who favor moving Thorpe’s remains 
to Oklahoma, as well as two of Jim Thorpe’s grandsons, 
Michael Koehler and John Thorpe, who oppose repatriation 
because they believe their grandfather should rest in peace 
and that their family’s burial decision should be respected.  
They are also concerned that the burial decisions of every 
Native American family will be jeopardized if the District 
Court’s decision stands.  Michael Koehler and John Thorpe 
are Charlotte Thorpe’s children.  Charlotte was the daughter 
of Jim and Iva Thorpe, Thorpe’s first wife. 
 
12 We must also ensure that we have jurisdiction to hear this 
case, because the “jurisdiction conferred by the Judiciary Act 
of 1789 . . . did not extend to probate matters.”  Markham v. 
Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946).   There are three 
circumstances in which the probate exception to jurisdiction 
applies: when the court is working to probate or annul a will, 
administer a decedent’s estate, or assume in rem jurisdiction 
over property that is in the custody of the probate court.  
Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311-12 (2006).  “[I]t 
does not bar federal courts from adjudicating matters outside 
those confines and otherwise within federal jurisdiction.”  Id. 
at 312.   This case involves the status of Thorpe’s remains, 
not his estate or will, and therefore does not touch upon 
anything that could be considered a “probate matter.” 
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IV. HISTORY AND OVERVIEW OF NAGPRA 
 
 NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013, was first enacted 
in 1990 “as a way to correct past abuses to, and guarantee 
protection for, the human remains and cultural objects of 
Native American tribal culture.”  173 A.L.R. Fed. 585.  It was 
passed with two main objectives: “first, to protect Native 
American burial sites and to require excavation of such sites 
only by permit, and second, to set up a process by which 
federal agencies and museums holding Native American 
remains and cultural artifacts will inventory those items and 
work with tribes to repatriate them.”  Kickapoo Traditional 
Tribe of Tex. v. Chacon, 46 F. Supp. 2d 644, 649 (W.D. Tex. 
1999)(citing H.R. Rep. No. 101-877 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4367, 4367-68 (“H.R. Rep.”)); United States v. 
Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 799-800 (10th Cir. 1997).   
 
 The Act was an attempt to respond to the looting and 
plundering of Native American burial grounds and the theft of 
cultural artifacts from Native American tribes that continued 
to pour salt into the many wounds that have been inflicted on 
Native Americans throughout the history of the United States. 
As stated in the House Report:  
 Digging and removing the contents of 
Native American graves for reasons of profit or 
curiosity has been common practice.  These 
activities were at their peak during the last 
century and the early part of this century. 
 
 In 1868, the Surgeon General issued an 
order to all Army field officers to send him 
Indian skeletons.  This was done so that studies 
could be performed to determine whether the 
Indian was inferior to the white man due to the 
size of the Indian’s cranium.  This action, along 
with an attitude that accepted the desecration of 
countless Native American burial sites, resulted 
in hundreds of thousands Native American 
human remains and funerary objects being sold 
or housed in museums and educational 
institutions around the county. 
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 For many years, Indian tribes have 
attempted to have the remains and funerary 
objects of their ancestors returned to them.  This 
effort has touched off an often heated debate on 
the rights of the Indian versus the importance to 
museums of the retention of their collections 
and the scientific value of the items. 
 
H. R. Rep.  The scope of the cultural plundering is 
breathtaking.  “National estimates are that between 100,000 
and two million deceased Native people have been dug up 
from their graves for storage or display by government 
agencies, museums, universities and tourist attractions.”  Jack 
F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American 
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act: Background and 
Legislative History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 39 (1992).   
 
 The movement to pass a law protecting Native 
American human remains, funerary objects, cultural 
patrimony and sacred objects originated in a hearing held by 
the Select Committee on Indian Affairs in 1987. That hearing 
was for a bill that would provide for the repatriation of Indian 
artifacts.  S. Rep. No. 101-473 (1990) (“S. Rep.”).  
Smithsonian Secretary Robert McCormick Adams testified 
that of the 34,000 remains in the Institution’s collection, 
approximately 42.5% of the specimens were the remains of 
North American Indians.  “Tribal reaction to Secretary 
Adams’ testimony was swift, and in the months which 
followed, Indian tribes around the country called for the 
repatriation of those human remains that could be identified 
as associated with a specific tribe or region for their 
permanent disposition in accordance with tribal customs and 
traditions, and for the proper burial elsewhere of” 
nonidentifiable remains.  Id.  The proposed bill led to 
additional hearings, which resulted in establishing a year-long 
Panel for a National Dialogue on Museum/Native American 
Relations between museum professionals and Native 
Americans, designed to develop recommendations to address 
the necessity of responding to tribal demands for repatriation.  
The National Museum of the American Indian Act, enacted in 
1989, was the precursor to NAGPRA and established such a 
museum in the Smithsonian.  It also included provisions for 
the treatment and disposition of human remains and sacred 
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objects, including an inventory process.  Pub. L. No. 101-185 
(1989).   
 
 Legislative efforts to protect Native American remains 
continued throughout 1989 and 1990.  During a hearing of the 
Select Committee on Indian Affairs, tribal representatives 
testified that:  
in cases where Native Americans have 
attempted to regain items that were 
inappropriately alienated from their tribes, they 
have met with resistance from museums and 
have lacked the legal ability of [sic] financial 
resources to pursue the return of the items.  
Several witnesses testified that in many 
instances Indian tribes do not know what types 
of remains or objects are in the possession of 
museums and have been unsuccessful in their 
attempts to obtain access to this information.  
 
S. Rep.   
 
 Native American leaders also spoke about the need to 
provide additional protections to Native American burial 
sites.  They testified that: 
Indian tribes have had many difficulties in 
preventing the illegal excavation of graves on 
tribal and Federal lands.  Several witnesses 
testified that there is a flourishing trade in 
funerary and sacred objects that have been 
obtained from burials located on tribal and 
Federal lands.  Additional testimony was 
received from witnesses who indicated that 
tribal and Federal officials have been unable to 
prevent the continued looting of Native 
American graves and the sale of these objects 
by unscrupulous collectors.  
 
 Id.   
 The repatriation procedure proposed was modeled 
after the National Museum of the American Indian Act, 
which authorizes the repatriation of human remains and 
funerary objects from the collections of the Smithsonian 
Institution.  S. Rep.  New procedural requirements were a 
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response to testimony by tribal witnesses about  “vast 
numbers of Native American human remains contained in the 
Smithsonian collections which, according to tribal religious 
practices, must be given appropriate burials.”  Id.   
 
 The first draft of the Native American Repatriation of 
Cultural Patrimony Act —which eventually became 
NAGPRA — was modeled after the provisions contained in 
the National Museum of the American Indian Act.  It 
attempted to “extend the inventory, identification and 
repatriation provisions [in the National Museum of the 
American Indian Act] to all Federal agencies and any 
institution which receives Federal funding.”  Id.  This bill, 
along with a bill introduced by Senator McCain, the Native 
American Grave and Burial Protection Act, formed the basis 
of NAGPRA.  NAGPRA extended the Museum of the 
American Indian Act to “Federal agencies and museums 
receiving Federal funds.”  Id.  “NAGPRA’s reach in 
protecting against further desecration of burial sites and 
restoring countless ancestral remains and cultural and sacred 
items to their tribal homes warrants its aspirational 
characterization as ‘human rights legislation.’”  United States 
v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 800 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Trope 
& Echo-Hawk, supra, at 37). 
 
 NAGPRA has two parallel procedures, depending on 
whether the item in question is held by a federal agency or 
museum or is discovered on federal lands after November 16, 
1990, NAGPRA’s effective date.  Pueblo of San Ildefonso v. 
Ridlon, 103 F.3d 936, 938 (10th Cir. 1996).  “First, the Act 
addresses items excavated on federal lands after November 
16, 1990 and enables Native American groups affiliated with 
those items to claim ownership.  See 43 C.F.R. § 10.1 (1995); 
H.R. Rep. No. 101-877. . . .  Second, NAGPRA provides for 
repatriation of cultural items currently held by federal 
agencies, including federally-funded museums.”  Id.  
 
 The procedure for repatriation of human remains under 
NAGPRA is as follows: “Each Federal agency and each 
museum which has possession or control over holdings or 
collections of Native American human remains . . . shall 
compile an inventory [defined as “a simple itemized list”] of 
such [holdings or collections of Native American human 
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remains] and, to the extent possible based on information 
possessed by such museum or Federal agency, identify the 
geographical and cultural affiliation of such item.”  25 U.S.C. 
§ 3003(a).  These are required to be completed in consultation 
with tribal governments no later than five years after 
November 16, 1990, and made available to a review 
committee established under the statute.  25 U.S.C. § 
3003(b)(1).   
 
 If the cultural affiliation of Native American human 
remains is established, then “the Federal agency or museum, 
upon the request of a known lineal descendant of the Native 
American or of the tribe or organization,” shall return the 
remains.  25 U.S.C. § 3005(a)(1).  Where there are multiple 
requests for repatriation of any cultural item (which includes 
human remains), and the museum cannot clearly determine 
which requesting party is the most appropriate claimant, the 
museum may retain such item until the requesting parties 
agree upon its disposition or the dispute is otherwise resolved 
pursuant to the provisions of this chapter or by a court of 
competent jurisdiction.  25 U.S.C. § 3005(e).  Any “museum” 
that fails to comply with these requirements may be assessed 
a civil penalty by the Secretary of the Interior.  25 U.S.C. § 
3007. 
 
V. THE BOROUGH IS NOT A “MUSEUM” UNDER 
NAGPRA13 
 
 NAGPRA defines the word “museum” very broadly, 
as: 
any institution or State or local government 
agency (including any institution of higher 
learning) that receives Federal funds and has 
possession of, or control over, Native American 
cultural items. 
 
25 U.S.C. § 3001(8).14  The Borough is a local government 
entity that maintains Jim Thorpe’s burial site.  The parties 
                                              
13 Because we find that the statute does not apply to the 
Borough, we will not consider the Borough’s constitutional 
arguments regarding NAGPRA. 
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agree that the Borough has “possession of, or control over,” 
Jim Thorpe’s remains, and that he is of Native American 
descent.  Thus, the main question before the District Court 
was whether the Borough “receives federal funds.” The 
District Court found that the Borough was a museum because 
the record showed that the Borough received federal funds 
after the enactment of NAGPRA.  However, for the following 
reasons, we find that the Borough is not a “museum” as 
intended by NAGPRA.  It is therefore not required to comply 
with NAGPRA’s procedural requirement of providing an 
inventory of Thorpe’s remains.  Similarly, it is not subject to 
the statute’s requirement that his remains be “returned” to 
Thorpe’s descendants for “repatriation” at their request.15  
 
   Ordinarily, we look to the text of the statute, rather 
than the legislative history, to interpret a statute or determine 
legislative intent as an aid to interpretation.  See Conn. Nat’l 
Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (“[C]ourts 
must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means 
and means in a statute what it says there.”); In re Visteon 
Corp., 612 F.3d 210, 220 (3d Cir. 2010) (“It is for Congress, 
not the courts, to enact legislation.  When courts disregard the 
language Congress has used in an unambiguous statute, they 
amend or repeal that which Congress enacted into law.”); 
First Merchs. Acceptance Corp. v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 198 
F.3d 394, 402 (3d Cir. 1999).   However, this rule of 
statutory construction is not an inviolable commandment that 
                                                                                                     
14 “‘[C]ultural items means human remains and [associated 
funerary objects, unassociated funerary objects, sacred 
objects, and cultural patrimony].”  25 U.S.C. § 3001(3).  
“Human remains” is not defined in the statute, but is defined 
in the regulations that correspond to the statute to mean “the 
physical remains of the body of a person of Native American 
ancestry.”  43 C.F.R. § 10.2(d)(1). 
15 Despite Plaintiffs’ characterization of Thorpe’s move from 
the Borough to Oklahoma as a “repatriation” or a “return,” 
the parties all agree that Thorpe was never actually buried in 
Oklahoma.  As we have explained, a ritual burial started 
there, but was never actually completed. Rather, his wife 
interrupted the burial and caused his remains to be transferred 
to Pennsylvania for burial in the Borough. 
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we must blindly enforce regardless of surrounding 
circumstances or the practical results of rigidly applying the 
text to a given situation.  Thus, we have made exceptions in 
rare cases in which “the literal application of a statute will 
produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of 
its drafters.”  First Merchs., 198 F.3d at 402 (quoting Griffin 
v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).  “In 
such situations, ‘those intentions must be controlling.’”  Id.  
As the Supreme Court has explained,  “[s]tatutory 
interpretations ‘which would produce absurd results are to be 
avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the 
legislative purpose are available.”  Id. (quoting Griffin, 458 
U.S. at 575).  “But only absurd results and ‘the most 
extraordinary showing of contrary intentions’ justify a 
limitation on the ‘plain meaning’ of the statutory language.”  
Id. (quoting Garcia, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984)); see also United 
States v. Terlingo, 327 F.3d 216, 221 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting 
that courts may look behind a statute only when the plain 
meaning produces “a result that is not just unwise but is 
clearly absurd”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Furthermore, “a reviewing court should not confine 
itself to examining a particular statutory provision in 
isolation.  Rather, [t]he meaning—or ambiguity—of certain 
words or phrases may only become evident when placed in 
context.”  Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 666 (2007) (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted).  “A court must . . .  interpret the 
statute as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme, and 
fit, if possible, all parts into an harmonious whole.”  FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 
(2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has concluded that  “[a]n 
inference drawn from congressional silence certainly cannot 
be credited when it is contrary to all other textual and 
contextual evidence of congressional intent.”  Burns v. United 
States, 501 U.S. 129, 136 (1991), abrogated on other grounds 
by Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 
 We conclude that we are confronted with the unusual 
situation in which literal application of NAGPRA “will 
produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of 
its drafters.”  Griffin, 458 U.S. at 571.  We must therefore 
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look beyond the text of NAGPRA to identify the intentions of 
the drafters of the statute, and that intent “must . . . control[] 
[our analysis.]”  Id.   
 
 As we have explained, NAGPRA requires 
“repatriation” of human remains from “museums,” where 
those remains have been collected and studied for 
archeological or historical purposes.  25 U.S.C. § 3005.  It is 
clear from the legislative history we have recounted above 
that Congress was also concerned with returning to Native 
American tribes the human remains and artifacts that had 
been taken for profit, gain, exploitation, or rank curiosity 
without regard to the concerns of the Native American tribe 
whose legitimate and paramount interest should have been 
recognized.  However, the definition of  “museum” in the text 
of NAGPRA sweeps much wider than that.  If interpreted 
literally, it would include any state or local governmental 
entity that “has possession of, or control over, Native 
American cultural items[]” regardless of the circumstances 
surrounding the possession.  This could include any items 
given freely by a member of the tribe.  Here, it would include 
human remains buried in accordance with the wishes of the 
decedent’s next-of-kin.  Literal application would even reach 
situations where the remains of a Native American were 
disposed of in a manner consistent with the deceased’s wishes 
as appropriately memorialized in a testamentary instrument or 
communicated to his or her family.  There is therefore no 
limitation that would preserve the final wishes of a given 
Native American or exempt determination of his or her final 
resting place from the procedural requirements of 
NAGPRA.16  
                                              
16 NAGPRA defines a museum’s legitimate right of 
possession to include human remains that were freely given 
by the decedent’s next-of-kin. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(13) (“The 
original acquisition of Native American human remains and 
associated funerary objects which were excavated, exhumed, 
or otherwise obtained with full knowledge and consent of the 
next of kin . . .  is deemed to give right of possession to those 
remains.”).  
 The statute does not explain the legal effect of this 
definition.  NAGPRA provides that a museum may keep 
certain items requested by a descendent or tribe if the 
17 
 
 
 “We have reserved some scope for adopting a 
restricted rather than a literal or usual meaning of [a statute’s] 
words where acceptance of that meaning would thwart the 
obvious purpose of the statute.”  Griffin, 458 U.S. at 571 
(internal quotations, ellipsis and citation omitted).  Here, it is 
clear that the congressional intent to regulate institutions such 
as museums and to remedy the historical atrocities inflicted 
on Native Americans, including plundering of their graves, is 
not advanced by interpreting “museum” to include a gravesite 
that Thorpe’s widow intended as Thorpe’s final resting place.  
As we stated earlier, Plaintiffs do not maintain that Patsy was 
without authority to determine where Thorpe was to be 
buried.  Moreover, as also explained above, the record is clear 
that Plaintiffs delayed bringing this suit until certain of 
Thorpe’s survivors who favored his burial in the Borough 
died.  
 
 As stated in the House Report, “[t]he purpose of 
[NAGPRA] is to protect Native American burial sites and the 
removal of human remains.”  H. R. Rep. (emphasis added).   
NAGPRA was intended as a shield against further injustices 
to Native Americans.  It was not intended to be wielded as a 
sword to settle familial disputes within Native American 
families.  Yet, that is what we would allow if we were to 
enforce NAGPRA’s repatriation provisions as written here. 
 
Aside from the unusual arrangements between Patsy 
Thorpe and the Borough, and Plaintiffs’ understandable 
desire to move Thorpe’s remains to where they prefer for him 
to be buried,17 his burial in the Borough is no different than 
                                                                                                     
museum “prove[s] that it has a right of possession to the 
objects.” 25 U.S.C. § 3005(c).  However, this section by its 
terms does not apply to human remains, and instead only 
applies to “unassociated funerary objects, sacred objects or 
objects of cultural patrimony[.]” Id.  Even if this section was 
interpreted to apply to human remains, however, it is not clear 
that a museum with a right of possession over those remains 
would be exempt from the procedural and inventory 
requirements of NAGPRA. 
17 Nothing we have said prevents Plaintiffs from seeking 
reinterment via an action in Pennsylvania state court.  
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any other burial, except that he is a legendary figure of Native 
American descent.  If we were to find that NAGPRA applies 
to Thorpe’s burial, we would also have to conclude that it 
applies to any grave located in “any institution or State or 
local government agency . . . that receives federal funds and 
has possession of, or control over, Native American cultural 
items.”  This could call into question any “institution” or 
“State or local government agency” that controls a cemetery 
or grave site where Native Americans are buried, and would 
give rights to any lineal descendant or tribe that has a claim to 
a person buried in such a cemetery.  The Amicus brief on 
behalf of Thorpe’s grandsons, Michael Koehler and John 
Thorpe, makes this clear:  
Imagine a scenario where a deceased person is 
buried by his widow at the site of her choosing.  
But after the widow dies, the next generation – 
or even complete strangers in the case of a tribe 
– decides to dig up the body with court approval 
and move it somewhere else for any reason they 
desire.  They aren’t even required to bury the 
remains.  This is not a “parade of horribles” 
conjured up by the Thorpe grandsons.  That is 
their reality.  If the district court’s decision is 
allowed to stand, this scenario can repeat for 
funerals past and future as long as the deceased 
has any Native American ancestry. 
 
Amicus Br. for Koehler and Thorpe, at 5.   Accordingly, 
“based solely on the language and context of the most 
relevant statutory provisions, the court cannot say that 
Congress’s intent is so clear and unambiguous that it 
                                                                                                     
However, “once a body is interred there is great reluctance in 
permitting same to be moved, absent clear and compelling 
reasons for such a move.”  Novelli v. Carroll, 420 A.2d 469, 
476 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (Watkins, J., dissenting) (citing 
Stevens v. Ganz, 49 Pa. D. & C.2d 283, 286 (1970)); see also 
Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A. 878, 880 (Pa. 1904) (“With 
regard to a reinterment in a different place, the same rules 
should apply, but with a presumption against removal 
growing stronger with the remoteness of connection with the 
decedent, and reserving always the right of the court to 
require reasonable cause to be shown for it.”). 
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‘foreclose[s] any other interpretation.’”  King v. Burwell, 759 
F.3d 358, 369 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Grapevine Imports, 
Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1367, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).  
    
 There are numerous indications that Congress did not 
intend for NAGPRA to apply to this situation.  The Senate 
Report explains that the statute was designed to “provide 
additional protections to Native American burial sites. Indian 
tribes have had many difficulties in preventing the illegal 
excavation of graves on tribal and Federal lands [, and] tribal 
and Federal officials have been unable to prevent the 
continued looting of Native American graves and the sale of 
these objects by unscrupulous collectors.”  S. Rep.  The 
Amicus brief submitted by the National Congress of the 
American Indians in support of Plaintiffs summarized the 
Antiquities Act of 1906.  That Act defined Native American 
remains on federal lands as “archeological resources[.]”  
Amicus Br. of Nat’l Cong. of the Am. Indians, at 6.  The 
collateral consequence was the disinterment of many remains 
for preservation in museums. The amici also refer to the 
Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979.  That 
statute also deemed Native American remains on federal 
lands “archaeological resources” and permitted those remains 
to be disinterred. Id. at 6-7. This was in “sharp contrast to the 
legal treatment of non-Indian burials and remains, which were 
generally protected from looting and disturbance.  NAGPRA 
was needed to ensure equal treatment of Native American 
remains.”  Id. (emphasis added).  With this objective, 
“Congress sought to repatriate human remains and other 
objects by ensuring human remains . . . are returned.”  Id. at 
10.   
 
 Our conclusion that Congress did not intend the result 
required by a literal application of the text of NAGPRA is 
reinforced by examining multiple sections of the statute.  For 
example, as noted earlier, § 3001(13) defines “right of 
possession” to include human remains freely given by the 
deceased or the deceased’s next of kin. This definition is 
further evidence of Congress’s intent to exclude situations 
such as Thorpe’s burial in the Borough.  Our conclusion is 
also consistent with the inventory requirement.  Section 3003 
applies to a “museum which has possession or control over 
holdings or collections of Native American human 
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remains[.]”  This implies that the statute assumes that a 
museum is holding or collecting the remains for the purposes 
of display or study, as opposed to serving as an original burial 
site.  Finally, NAGPRA requires that remains be “returned.” 
25 U. S. C. § 3005.  This assumes that the human remains 
were moved from their intended final resting place. Thorpe 
was buried in the Borough by his wife, and she had the legal 
authority to decide where he would be buried.  Thus, there is 
nowhere for Thorpe to be “returned” to.  As the House Report  
explains: “[f]or many years, Indian tribes have attempted to 
have the remains and funerary objects of their ancestors 
returned to them.”  H.R. Rep. (emphasis added). 
 
 Thorpe’s remains are located at their final resting place 
and have not been disturbed.  We find that applying 
NAGPRA to Thorpe’s burial in the Borough is such a clearly 
absurd result and so contrary to Congress’s intent to protect 
Native American burial sites that the Borough cannot be held 
to the requirements imposed on a museum under these 
circumstances.  We reverse the District Court and hold that 
the Borough is not a “museum” under NAGPRA for the 
purposes of Thorpe’s burial.18   
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the 
judgment of the District Court as to the applicability of 
NAGPRA to the burial of Jim Thorpe in the Borough, and 
affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ § 1983 
claim.  We will remand the action for the District Court to 
enter judgment in favor of Appellant, the Borough of Jim 
Thorpe.   
  
                                              
18 In the cross-appeal, the Plaintiffs challenge the District 
Court’s finding that they cannot obtain relief for a violation of 
NAGPRA under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  In light of our finding 
that NAGPRA is not applicable to Thorpe’s burial in the 
Borough, Plaintiffs cannot sustain a claim for a violation of 
NAGPRA under either that statute or § 1983.  Therefore we 
will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ § 1983 
claim. 
